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Multiagent resource allocation in k-additive domains: preference representation and complexity

Estivie, Sylvia; Endriss, Ulle; Chevaleyre, Yann; Maudet, Nicolas (2008), Multiagent resource allocation in k-additive domains: preference representation and complexity, Annals of Operations Research, 163, 1, p. 49-62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-008-0335-0

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2008
Nom de la revue
Annals of Operations Research
Volume
163
Numéro
1
Éditeur
Springer
Pages
49-62
Identifiant publication
Métadonnées
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Auteur(s)
Estivie, Sylvia
Endriss, Ulle
Chevaleyre, Yann
Maudet, Nicolas cc
Résumé (EN)
We study a framework for multiagent resource allocation where autonomous software agents negotiate over the allocation of bundles of indivisible resources. Connections to well-known combinatorial optimisation problems, including the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions, shed light on the computational complexity of the framework. We give particular consideration to scenarios where the preferences of agents are modelled in terms of k-additive utility functions, i.e. scenarios where synergies between different resources are restricted to bundles of at most k items.
Mots-clés
Resource Allocation; Negociation; Multiagent Systems; Preference Representation; Computational Complexity