Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources
Endriss, Ulle; Maudet, Nicolas; Fariba, Sadri; Francesca, Toni (2006), Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources, The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 25, 3, p. 315–348. http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1613/jair.1870
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2006Journal name
The Journal of Artificial Intelligence ResearchVolume
25Number
3Publisher
AI Access Foundation
Pages
315–348
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to exchange bundles of indivisible resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of resources will be reached eventually.Subjects / Keywords
Système multi-agentsRelated items
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