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dc.contributor.authorChemla, Gilles
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-15T13:18:40Z
dc.date.available2009-12-15T13:18:40Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2715
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectManageren
dc.subjectAsset allocationen
dc.subjectShareholdersen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelG10en
dc.titleOptimal Portfolio Diversification and Product-Market Interactionsen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenAlthough most shareholders hold diversified portfolios, the corporate finance literature postulates that shareholders maximise firm value, while managers sometimes do not. We argue to the contrary that undiversified managers may care more about firm-level risk and return than about the value of their shareholders'diversified portfolio. These two objectives may differ in presence of product-market interactions. We derive a financial and product market equilibrium in presence of a large, diversified investor and a large number of small shareholders. Stock prices, asset allocation and product-market competition all depend on investors'risk-aversion, initial endowment, and industry characteristics. We discuss implications to institutional investor activism, executive compensation contracts, venture capital, and the decision to go public.en
dc.identifier.citationpages25en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen
dc.relation.conftitleAFFI 2004 (Association Française de Finance)en
dc.relation.confdate2004-12
dc.relation.confcityParisen
dc.relation.confcountryFranceen


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