Date
2006
Indexation documentaire
Croissance et développement économiques
Subject
SOCIAL development; INTERNATIONAL Labour Organisation; ECONOMIC development; TRADE regulation; TRADE negotiation; LABOR laws & legislation
Code JEL
O19; O16; F16; F13
Nom de la revue
Journal of World Trade
Volume
40
Numéro
5
Date de publication
10-2006
Pages article
813-836
Nom de l'éditeur
Aspen Publishers
Auteur
Granger, Clotilde
Siroën, Jean-Marc
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Résumé en anglais
Although discussion concerning the inclusion of core labour standards has been excluded from the Doha agenda, the question continues to be debated. In fact, on an international level, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has become increasingly active since the World Trade Organization (WTO) Singapore Ministerial Declaration. On a regional level, social clauses are now being introduced inside preferential-trade agreements. These evolutions feed the debate regarding the link between labour standards and trade. This article takes a closer look at this debate and re-assesses the traditional economic analysis, which is today more sophisticated and balanced than was the case a few years ago. Improving labour standards, in association with trade openness, might speed up development. However, governments do not necessarily choose the best way to promote social and economic development. This fact can be explained by political economic analysis. In this article, we weigh the pro- and anti-social clause arguments of interest groups both within developed and developing countries, to explain national choices concerning labour standards. The issue also concerns the stability of international trade relations. We stress that although they are excluded from multilateral arrangements, core labour standards provisions are omnipresent in bilateral or regional preferential-trade agreements. This paradox is likely to jeopardize the multilateral system. Putting aside ethical or moral considerations, we show that economic arguments can possibly allow the inclusion of a non-protectionist, realistic and reasonable trade-labour linkage. We conclude that the inclusion of such a clause in multilateral trade law is less dangerous than its non-inclusion.