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dc.contributor.authorRichard, Chrystelle
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-12T13:13:27Z
dc.date.available2009-11-12T13:13:27Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2426
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectauditen
dc.subjectindependenceen
dc.subjecteconomic sociologyen
dc.subjectpeers' relationshipen
dc.subject.ddc657en
dc.subject.classificationjelA14en
dc.subject.classificationjelM42en
dc.titleWhy an auditor can't be competent and independent: a French case studyen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis research proposes an understanding of the role of the relationship between the finance director and the auditor in the audit process and its effect on audit quality. We adopt an interpretative and qualitative approach. Based on 60 interviews, this qualitative method is the object of an interpretative process, composed of two complementary theoretical fields: contractual economic theories and economic sociology. Two notions emerge from this process, which are considered as the interpretation bases: relationship dualism (professional/personal relationship) and hybrid trust. This interpretative conception leads to a redefinition of the relationship between a finance director and an auditor as a peers' relationship. The emergence conditions of a peers' relationship are the sharing of professional and cultural norms, the frequency of relationship and the multiplexity of relationship. A peers' relationship is characterised by a hybrid trust, a joint generation of knowledge and a role equality. This parity conception of a relationship leads to a new reading of the foundations of audit quality that are auditor independence and competence. Audit quality appears as a balance between its two determinants, competence and independence.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEuropean Accounting Review
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol15en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2006
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages153-179en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638180500104832en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherRoutledge Taylor and Francis Groupen
dc.subject.ddclabelContrôle de gestion Comptabilitéen


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