Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics
Mertikopoulos, Panayotis; Viossat, Yannick (2022), Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics, Journal of Dynamics and Games, 9, 4, p. 499-528. 10.3934/jdg.2022021
View/ Open
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2022Journal name
Journal of Dynamics and GamesVolume
9Number
4Publisher
AIMS - American Institute of Mathematical Sciences
Pages
499-528
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAuthor(s)
Mertikopoulos, Panayotis
Performance analysis and optimization of LARge Infrastructures and Systems [POLARIS ]
Viossat, Yannick
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Abstract (EN)
The literature on evolutionary game theory suggests that pure strategies that are strictly dominated by other pure strategies always become extinct under imitative game dynamics, but they can survive under innovative dynamics. As we explain, this is because innovative dynamics favour rare strategies while standard imitative dynamics do not. However, as we also show, there are reasonable imitation protocols that favour rare or frequent strategies, thus allowing strictly dominated strategies to survive in large classes of imitation dynamics. Dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.Subjects / Keywords
Evolutionary game theory; evolutionary game dynamics; imitation; dominated strategies; survival; rationalityRelated items
Showing items related by title and author.
-
Mertikopoulos, Panayotis; Viossat, Yannick (2016) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Viossat, Yannick (2011) Document de travail / Working paper
-
Viossat, Yannick (2015) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Viossat, Yannick (2005-05) Document de travail / Working paper
-
Viossat, Yannick (2008) Article accepté pour publication ou publié