Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single-crossing case

Sémirat, Stéphan; Forges, Françoise

Sémirat, Stéphan; Forges, Françoise (2022), Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single-crossing case, Games and Economic Behavior, 134, p. 242-263. 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.004

Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2022-07

Journal name

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

134

Publisher

Elsevier

Pages

242-263

Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble [GAEL]
Forges, Françoise
Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]

Abstract (EN)

We consider games in which an informed sender first talks at no cost to a receiver; then, the latter proposes a decision and, finally, the sender accepts the proposal or “exits”. We make the following assumptions: the sender has finitely many types, the receiver's decision is real-valued, utility functions over decisions are concave, single-peaked and single-crossing, exit is damaging to the receiver. In this setup, it may happen that babbling equilibria necessarily involve exit. We nevertheless propose a constructive algorithm that achieves a pure perfect Bayesian equilibrium without exit in every game of the class considered.

Subjects / Keywords

Discrete cheap talk; Participation constraints; Single-crossing

JEL

C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design