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The response of taxpayer compliance to the large shock of Italian unification

dc.contributor.authorAcconcia, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorD'Amato, Marcello
dc.contributor.authorMartina, Riccardo
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
dc.contributor.authorRatto, Marisa
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-24T14:53:53Z
dc.date.available2023-01-24T14:53:53Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.issn0176-2680
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/23822
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectState formationen
dc.subjectTax shocken
dc.subjectNoncomplianceen
dc.subjectDecentralized enforcementen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D6.D62en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D8.D81en
dc.subject.classificationjelH.H2.H26en
dc.subject.classificationjelK.K4.K41en
dc.subject.classificationjelK.K4.K42en
dc.titleThe response of taxpayer compliance to the large shock of Italian unificationen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenBecause of differences in the levels of taxation among pre-unitary states, Italian unification in 1861 determined differential increments in the tax burden among areas of the country. We constructed an index of these tax shocks and collected province-level data on historical and current indicators of tax evasion to evaluate the impact of the unification on tax compliance. We show that the historical variability in tax evasion reduced a lot in the following decades and that the convergence process preserved quite well the ranking in compliance among provinces. We also find that the shock to the tax burden explains much of the historical and current variability in tax evasion. The role of local congestion externalities, arising within a decentralized system of tax enforcement as that set in Italy, is formally explored to account for such evidence.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEuropean Journal of Political Economy
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol73en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2022-06
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages102-158en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102158en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2023-01-24T13:20:44Z
hal.identifierhal-03954598
hal.version1
dc.subject.classificationjelHALD - Microeconomics::D6 - Welfare Economics::D62 - Externalitiesen
dc.subject.classificationjelHALD - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertaintyen
dc.subject.classificationjelHALH - Public Economics::H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue::H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidanceen
dc.subject.classificationjelHALK - Law and Economics::K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior::K41 - Litigation Processen
dc.subject.classificationjelHALK - Law and Economics::K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior::K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Lawen
hal.date.transferred2023-01-24T14:53:55Z
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