Show simple item record

On (approximate) pure Nash equilibria in preference games

hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
dc.contributor.authorFanelli, Angelo
HAL ID: 179296
ORCID: 0000-0002-4896-6889
hal.structure.identifierNational Technical University of Athens [Athens] [NTUA]
dc.contributor.authorFotakis, Dimitris
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-20T18:03:46Z
dc.date.available2023-01-20T18:03:46Z
dc.date.issued2022-11
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/23795
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subject.ddc003en
dc.titleOn (approximate) pure Nash equilibria in preference gamesen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenIn this work we introduce and study a general model of preference game. Our game belongs to the large class of games in which each agent aims at compromising between her innate preferences and the choices of the neighbours. Our game encompasses two models, i.e., the full information and the partial information settings. While in the former each agent is fully aware of the strategies of the neighbours, in the latter each agent has only access to a single representative strategy, which can be regarded as the output of an aggregation function. Both settings are quite general and allow for a systematic study of the fundamental questions related to the existence and efficiency of (approximate) equilibria in the strategic interaction of agents in social networks. Interestingly, our bounds on the price of anarchy are very general and are derived in terms of key features of the game (i.e., social impact, boundary and stretch). Moreover, our results show that the two settings behave very similarly, thus confirming our conjecture that in general the lack of information does not affect the existence and efficiency of the (approximate) equilibria.en
dc.publisher.cityParisen
dc.identifier.citationpages1-12en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitlePreprint Lamsadeen
dc.identifier.urlsitehttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03865843en
dc.subject.ddclabelRecherche opérationnelleen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidatenonen
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.date.updated2023-01-20T18:00:37Z
hal.export.arxivnonen
hal.export.pmcnonen
hal.hide.repecnonen
hal.hide.oainonen
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record