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Coalition Formation Games and Social Ranking Solutions

hal.structure.identifierPolitecnico di Milano [Milan] [POLIMI]
dc.contributor.authorLucchetti, Roberto
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
dc.contributor.authorMoretti, Stefano
HAL ID: 739814
ORCID: 0000-0003-3627-3257
hal.structure.identifierPolitecnico di Milano [Milan] [POLIMI]
dc.contributor.authorRea, Tommaso
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-22T08:46:20Z
dc.date.available2022-12-22T08:46:20Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/23520
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCoalition Formation, Hedonic Games, Social Ranking, Core Stabilityen
dc.subject.ddc003en
dc.titleCoalition Formation Games and Social Ranking Solutionsen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenA social ranking (solution) over a set N is defined as a map assigning to each coalitional relation (i.e. a ranking over subsets of N) another ranking over the single elements in N. Differently, coalition formation situations, and, in particular, hedonic games, mainly focus on partitions of the set N into disjoint coalitions, which are in general referred to as coalition structures. A coalition structure may be stable according to various notions of stability and the objective is to understand under which conditions a coalition structure is stable. In this paper we merge the framework of coalition formation with the one of social rankings to keep into account the effect of hierarchies within coalitions on the stability of coalition structures. We consider alternative classes of coalition formation games where the preferences of the players over coalitions are induced by a social ranking. More precisely, players compare coalition structures keeping into account both the relative ranking of coalitions to which they belong (according to a coalitional relation) and their position in the social ranking within each coalition. Constructive characterizations of the set of stable coalition structures are provided for alternative classes of hedonic games, together with an impossibility result on the existence of stable coalition structures for (non-hedonic) coalition formation situations.en
dc.identifier.citationpages862–870en
dc.relation.ispartoftitleAAMAS '22: Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systemsen
dc.relation.ispartofeditorTaylor, Matthew E.
dc.relation.ispartofeditorPelachaud, Catherine
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameACM - Association for Computing Machineryen
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityNew York, NYen
dc.relation.ispartofdate2022-05
dc.relation.ispartofpages1990en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03829756en
dc.subject.ddclabelRecherche opérationnelleen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn978-1-4503-9213-6en
dc.relation.conftitle21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS '22)en
dc.relation.confdate2022-05
dc.relation.confcountryNew Zealanden
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidatenonen
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2022-12-22T08:37:34Z
hal.export.arxivnonen
hal.export.pmcnonen
hal.hide.repecnonen
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