Coalition Formation Games and Social Ranking Solutions
Lucchetti, Roberto; Moretti, Stefano; Rea, Tommaso (2022), Coalition Formation Games and Social Ranking Solutions, dans Taylor, Matthew E.; Pelachaud, Catherine, AAMAS '22: Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, ACM - Association for Computing Machinery : New York, NY, p. 862–870
Type
Communication / ConférenceLien vers un document non conservé dans cette base
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03829756Date
2022Titre du colloque
21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS '22)Date du colloque
2022-05Pays du colloque
New ZealandTitre de l'ouvrage
AAMAS '22: Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent SystemsAuteurs de l’ouvrage
Taylor, Matthew E.; Pelachaud, CatherineÉditeur
ACM - Association for Computing Machinery
Ville d’édition
New York, NY
Isbn
978-1-4503-9213-6
Nombre de pages
1990Pages
862–870
Métadonnées
Afficher la notice complèteAuteur(s)
Lucchetti, RobertoPolitecnico di Milano [Milan] [POLIMI]
Moretti, Stefano

Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Rea, Tommaso
Politecnico di Milano [Milan] [POLIMI]
Résumé (EN)
A social ranking (solution) over a set N is defined as a map assigning to each coalitional relation (i.e. a ranking over subsets of N) another ranking over the single elements in N. Differently, coalition formation situations, and, in particular, hedonic games, mainly focus on partitions of the set N into disjoint coalitions, which are in general referred to as coalition structures. A coalition structure may be stable according to various notions of stability and the objective is to understand under which conditions a coalition structure is stable. In this paper we merge the framework of coalition formation with the one of social rankings to keep into account the effect of hierarchies within coalitions on the stability of coalition structures. We consider alternative classes of coalition formation games where the preferences of the players over coalitions are induced by a social ranking. More precisely, players compare coalition structures keeping into account both the relative ranking of coalitions to which they belong (according to a coalitional relation) and their position in the social ranking within each coalition. Constructive characterizations of the set of stable coalition structures are provided for alternative classes of hedonic games, together with an impossibility result on the existence of stable coalition structures for (non-hedonic) coalition formation situations.Mots-clés
Coalition Formation, Hedonic Games, Social Ranking, Core StabilityPublications associées
Affichage des éléments liés par titre et auteur.
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Lucchetti, Roberto; Moretti, Stefano; Patrone, Fioravante; Radrizzani, Paola (2010) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
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Bernardi, Giulia; Lucchetti, Roberto; Moretti, Stefano (2019) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
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Lucchetti, Roberto; Moretti, Stefano; Patrone, Fioravante (2015) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
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Lucchetti, Roberto; Moretti, Stefano; Patrone, Fioravante (2013) Document de travail / Working paper
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Cesari, Giulia; Lucchetti, Roberto; Moretti, Stefano (2017) Article accepté pour publication ou publié