Discounted and Finitely Repeated Minority Games with Public Signals
Scarlatti, Sergio; Scarsini, Marco; Renault, Jérôme (2008), Discounted and Finitely Repeated Minority Games with Public Signals, Mathematical Social Sciences, 56, 1, p. 44-74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.004
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameMathematical Social Sciences
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game has imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this game was considered by Renault et al. (2005), who proved a folk theorem. Here we consider a discounted version and a ﬁnitely repeated version of the game, and we strengthen our previous result by showing that the set of equilibrium payoﬀs Hausdorﬀ-converges to the feasible set as either the discount factor goes to one or the number of repetition goes to inﬁnity. We show that the set of public equilibria for this game is strictly smaller than the set of private equilibria.
Subjects / KeywordsRepeated Games; Imperfect Monitoring; Public Equilibria; Private Equilibria; Discount Factor; Pareto-efficiency
Showing items related by title and author.