Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAngeloni, Laura
dc.contributor.authorMartins-da-Rocha, Victor-Filipe
HAL ID: 10403
ORCID: 0000-0002-6244-2678
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-27T14:00:16Z
dc.date.available2009-10-27T14:00:16Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2344
dc.descriptionCe document a également été édité dans la série des Cahiers de la Chaire "Les Particuliers face au Risques", n° 2009/5
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectLarge exchange economiesen
dc.subjectIncentive Compatibilityen
dc.subjectCompetitive and Core Allocationsen
dc.subjectDifferential informationen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelD51en
dc.titleLarge economies with differential information and without free disposalen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irre- ducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be in- centive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir, and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then, motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution, we adapt the incentive compatibility property introduced in Krasa and Yannelis (1994) and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEconomic Theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol38
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2009-02
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages263-286
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0369-1
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringer
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record