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Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance

hal.structure.identifierCentre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique [CREST]
hal.structure.identifierGroupe d'analyse et de théorie économique [GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne]
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé [Legos]
dc.contributor.authorGodard, Mathilde
HAL ID: 13766
dc.contributor.authorKoning, Pierre
dc.contributor.authorLindeboom, Martin
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-05T10:10:41Z
dc.date.available2022-07-05T10:10:41Z
dc.date.issued2020-04
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/23004
dc.description.abstractfrWe examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a major nationwide reform. The drastic 2003 “Gatekeeper Protocol” raised DI application costs and revealed more information about individual true ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (a 40% decrease in one year), with the largest decline occurring in difficult-to-diagnose impairments and less severe health disorders. This resulted in a more deserving pool of applicants. At the same time, those who stopped applying had worse health, worked less, and were more likely to be on UI and social assistance than workers who did not apply in the old system. There are no additional targeting gains at the point of the award decision, implying that changes in average health conditions of awardees were fully driven by self-screening and work resumption in the DI waiting period.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectDisability Insuranceen
dc.subjectScreeningen
dc.subjectTargeting Efficiencyen
dc.subject.ddc334en
dc.subject.classificationjelH20en
dc.subject.classificationjelI30en
dc.titleApplication and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insuranceen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherVU University Amsterdam;Netherlands
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherVrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics;Netherlands
dc.description.abstractenWe examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a major nationwide reform. The drastic 2003 “Gatekeeper Protocol” raised DI application costs and revealed more information about individual true ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative datashow substantial declines in DI application rates (a 40% decrease in one year), with the largest decline occurringin difficult-todiagnose impairments and less severe health disorders. This resulted in a more deserving pool of applicants. At the same time, those who stopped applying had worse health, worked less, and were more likelyto be on UI and social assistance than workers who did not apply in the old system. There are no additional targeting gains at the point of the award decision, implying that changes in average health conditions ofawardees were fully driven by self-screening and work resumption in the DI waiting period.en
dc.publisher.nameSSRNen
dc.publisher.cityRochesteren
dc.identifier.citationpages53en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleGATE working papersen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumberWP 2012en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3569683en
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie socialeen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceNationalen
dc.date.updated2022-01-04T13:49:21Z
hal.identifierhal-03714169
hal.version1
dc.subject.classificationjelHALH.H2.H20en
dc.subject.classificationjelHALI.I3.I30en
hal.date.transferred2022-07-05T10:10:43Z
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


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