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Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance

Godard, Mathilde; Koning, Pierre; Lindeboom, Martin (2022), Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance, The Journal of Human Resources, 57, 3. 10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2022-04
Journal name
The Journal of Human Resources
Volume
57
Number
3
Publisher
University of Wisconsin Press
Publication identifier
10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1
Metadata
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Author(s)
Godard, Mathilde
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique [CREST]
Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique [GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne]
Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé [Legos]
Koning, Pierre
Lindeboom, Martin
Abstract (EN)
We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic “Gatekeeper Protocol” increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals’ ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40% in one year) following the reform, particularly among difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals that were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by selfscreening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.
Subjects / Keywords
Disability Insurance; Screening; Applications; Awards; Targeting
JEL
H20 - General
I30 - General

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