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dc.contributor.authorVilleneuve, Bertrand
dc.contributor.authorYanhua Zhang, Vanessa
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-19T08:11:49Z
dc.date.available2009-10-19T08:11:49Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2271
dc.descriptionUne version de 2008 de ce texte est paru dans la série des Cahiers de la Chaire Finance et Développement Durable (n°11). La version mise en fichier attaché est une version actualisée.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectRegulatory consistencyen
dc.subjectCompetition policyen
dc.subjectDifferential gamesen
dc.subjectAssymetric duopolyen
dc.subjectCapacity Accumulationen
dc.subjectCournot competitionen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.subject.classificationjelL13en
dc.subject.classificationjelL40en
dc.titleMerger Remedies and Industry Restructuring: A Case for Affirmative Actionen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenWe analyze the trade-off faced by competition authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of sites or any other non-reproducible assets. The latter represent opportunities. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which firms may differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here appears to explain why helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversité Paris-Dauphine
dc.publisher.cityParis
dc.identifier.citationpages24en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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