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dc.contributor.authorSumaila, Ussif Rashid*
hal.structure.identifier
dc.contributor.authorPareja, Claudio*
hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
dc.contributor.authorEkeland, Ivar*
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-16T14:04:30Z
dc.date.available2009-10-16T14:04:30Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2268
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectGenerationsen
dc.subjectFish Stock Sustainabilityen
dc.subjectDiscount rateen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelQ22en
dc.subject.classificationjelQ5en
dc.titleFisheries Management and Intergenerational Equityen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenWe adapt the classical Schaefer model of fisheries management to take into account intergenerational equity, in the line of Sumaila ([18]) and Sumaila and Walters ([19]). The resulting discount rate then is non-constant, and the planner’s preferences are time inconsistent, so that optimal solutions are not implementable. In the line of Ekeland and Lazrak ([6], [7]) we define Markov subgame perfect equilibria of the underlying sequential game. We characterize equilibrium strategies by a simple relation, and we reach a robust conclusion, namely that, to take into account intergenerational equity, the rate of time preference, δ, should be replace by δ −n, where n is the rate of growth of the human population.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversité Paris-Dauphine
dc.publisher.cityParis
dc.identifier.citationpages26en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleCahiers de la Chaire Finance et Développement Durableen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber17en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen
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