Thumbnail

Fisheries Management and Intergenerational Equity

Sumaila, Ussif Rashid; Pareja, Claudio; Ekeland, Ivar (2009), Fisheries Management and Intergenerational Equity. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2268

Voir/Ouvrir
Type
Document de travail / Working paper
Date
2009
Éditeur
Université Paris-Dauphine
Titre de la collection
Cahiers de la Chaire Finance et Développement Durable
Numéro dans la collection
17
Ville d’édition
Paris
Pages
26
Métadonnées
Afficher la notice complète
Auteur(s)
Sumaila, Ussif Rashid

Pareja, Claudio

Ekeland, Ivar
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Résumé (EN)
We adapt the classical Schaefer model of fisheries management to take into account intergenerational equity, in the line of Sumaila ([18]) and Sumaila and Walters ([19]). The resulting discount rate then is non-constant, and the planner’s preferences are time inconsistent, so that optimal solutions are not implementable. In the line of Ekeland and Lazrak ([6], [7]) we define Markov subgame perfect equilibria of the underlying sequential game. We characterize equilibrium strategies by a simple relation, and we reach a robust conclusion, namely that, to take into account intergenerational equity, the rate of time preference, δ, should be replace by δ −n, where n is the rate of growth of the human population.
Mots-clés
Generations; Fish Stock Sustainability; Discount rate
JEL
Q22 - Fishery; Aquaculture
Q5 - Environmental Economics