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Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion

Forges, Françoise (2020), Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion, Annals of Economics and Statistics, 137, p. 3-30. 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.137.0003

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2020
Nom de la revue
Annals of Economics and Statistics
Numéro
137
Éditeur
Ecoles nationales d'économie et statistique
Pages
3-30
Identifiant publication
Métadonnées
Afficher la notice complète
Auteur(s)
Forges, Françoise
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Résumé (EN)
This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both when the agents monitoring information can lie (“cheap talk”) and when they cannot (“persuasion”).
Mots-clés
Incomplete Information; Repeated Game; Sender-Receiver Game; Bayesian Persuasion
JEL
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C72 - Noncooperative Games
B21 - Microeconomics