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hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
hal.structure.identifierCentre de Mathématiques Appliquées - Ecole Polytechnique [CMAP]
dc.contributor.authorRenault, Jérôme
HAL ID: 21086
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-20T15:09:31Z
dc.date.available2022-01-20T15:09:31Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.issn2224-1981
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/22456
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectApprovalen
dc.subjectCheap talken
dc.subjectSender–receiver gameen
dc.subjectParticipation constraintsen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.titleStrategic information transmission with sender's approvalen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe consider sender–receiver games in which the sender has finitely many types and the receiver makes a decision in a compact set. The new feature is that, after the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject in favor of an outside option. We focus on situations in which the sender’s approval is absolutely crucial to the receiver, namely, on equilibria in which the sender does not exit at the approval stage. A nonrevealing equilibrium without exit may not exist. Our main results are that if the sender has only two types or if the receiver’s preferences over decisions do not depend on the type of the sender, there exists a (perfect Bayesian Nash) partitional equilibrium without exit, in which the sender transmits information by means of a pure strategy. The previous existence results do not extend: we construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender and type-dependent utility functions) in which there is no equilibrium without exit, even if the sender can randomize over messages. We establish additional existence results for (possibly mediated) equilibria without exit in the three type case.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameInternational Journal of Game Theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol50en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2021-02
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages475-502en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2022-01-20T14:31:38Z
hal.identifierhal-03537857
hal.version1
dc.subject.classificationjelHALC.C7.C72en
dc.subject.classificationjelHALD.D8.D82en
hal.date.transferred2022-01-20T15:09:32Z
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


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