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dc.contributor.authorSakovics, J.
hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-20T15:05:24Z
dc.date.available2022-01-20T15:05:24Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/22455
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectNash Equilibriumen
dc.subjectthreaten
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD91en
dc.subject.classificationjelD83en
dc.subject.classificationjelD01en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.titleTenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the normen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherSchool of Economics, University of Edinburgh;United Kingdom
dc.description.abstractenWe formally assume that players in a game consider Nash Equilibrium (NE) thebehavioral norm. In önite games of perfect information this leads to a reönementof NE: Faithful Nash Equilibrium (FNE). FNE is outcome equivalent to NE of theìtrimmedî game, obtained by restricting the original tree to its NE paths. Thus,it always exists but it need not be unique. Iterating the norm ensures uniquenessof outcome. FNE may violate backward induction when subgame perfection requires play according to the SPE following a deviation from it. We thus provide analternative view of tenable threats in equilibrium analysis.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversity of Edimburgen
dc.publisher.cityEdimburgen
dc.identifier.citationpages21en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleEdinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber301en
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.date.updated2022-01-20T14:37:44Z
hal.identifierhal-03537845
hal.version1
dc.subject.classificationjelHALD.D9.D91en
dc.subject.classificationjelHALD.D8.D83en
dc.subject.classificationjelHALD.D0.D01en
dc.subject.classificationjelHALC.C7.C73en
dc.subject.classificationjelHALC.C7.C72en
hal.date.transferred2022-01-20T15:05:25Z
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


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