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hal.structure.identifierCentre d'économie de la Sorbonne [CES]
hal.structure.identifierInstitut de recherches économiques et sociales [UCL IRES]
dc.contributor.authorMariani, Fabio
hal.structure.identifierDéveloppement, institutions et analyses de long terme [DIAL]
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
dc.contributor.authorMercier, Marion
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-27T11:54:30Z
dc.date.available2021-09-27T11:54:30Z
dc.date.issued2021-05
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/21838
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectMigrationen
dc.subjectCrimeen
dc.subject.ddc338.9en
dc.subject.classificationjelO17en
dc.subject.classificationjelK42en
dc.subject.classificationjelF22en
dc.titleImmigration and crime: the role of self-selection and institutionsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenContrary to popular perception, empirical evidence suggests that immigrants do not necessarily commit more crimes than natives, in spite of having lower legitimate earning opportunities. To make sense of this, we propose a novel theoretical framework based on a predator/prey model of crime, where endogenous migration decisions and career choices (between licit and illicit activities) are jointly determined. In this setting, we show that the involvement of migrants in crime crucially depends on self-selection into migration, as well as on productivity and institutional quality in the host economy. In particular, immigrants may display a lower crime rate than natives even if they are less productive on the honest labor market – and this result can still hold if career choices are revised after migration. We also find that stricter immigration policies could induce an adverse selection of migrants, and eventually attract more foreign-born criminals. Finally, a dynamic extension of our model can account for the higher crime rates of second-generation immigrants, and highlights the critical role of immigration and assimilation for the long-run evolution of crime and institutions in host countries.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol185en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2021-05
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages538-564en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1016/j.jebo.2021.03.011en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelCroissance et développement économiquesen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2021-09-14T08:05:32Z
hal.identifierhal-03355464
hal.version1
dc.subject.classificationjelHALO.O1.O17en
dc.subject.classificationjelHALK.K4.K42en
dc.subject.classificationjelHALF.F2.F22en
hal.date.transferred2021-09-27T11:54:31Z
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


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