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hal.structure.identifierDauphine Recherches en Management [DRM]
dc.contributor.authorChemla, Gilles
dc.contributor.authorHennessy, Christopher A.
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-13T13:42:21Z
dc.date.available2021-09-13T13:42:21Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.issn0304-3932
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/21759
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectNatural experimentsen
dc.subjectCausalityen
dc.subjectPolicyen
dc.subjectendogeneityen
dc.subject.ddc339en
dc.subject.classificationjelE.E6.E61en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D7.D78en
dc.subject.classificationjelG.G1.G18en
dc.subject.classificationjelH.H0.H00en
dc.subject.classificationjelO.O2.O21en
dc.titleRational Expectations and the Paradox of Policy-Relevant Experimentsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenPolicy experiments using large microeconomic datasets have recently gained ground in macroeconomics. Imposing rational expectations, we examine robustness of evidence derived from ideal natural experiments applied to atomistic agents in dynamic settings. Paradoxically, once experimental evidence is viewed as sufficiently clean to use, it then becomes contaminated by ex post endogeneity: Measured responses depend upon priors and the objective function into which evidence is fed. Moreover, agents’ policy beliefs become endogenously correlated with their causal parameters, severely clouding inference, e.g. sign reversals and non-invertibility may obtain. Treatment-control differences are contaminated for non-quadratic adjustment costs. Constructively, we illustrate how inference can be corrected accounting for feedback and highlight factors mitigating contamination.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Monetary Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol114en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2020-10
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages368-381en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.05.002en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelEquilibre macroéconomique. Cycles économiques (économie politique)en
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2021-09-13T10:22:10Z
hal.identifierhal-03342778
hal.version1
dc.subject.classificationjelHALE - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics::E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook::E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordinationen
dc.subject.classificationjelHALD - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementationen
dc.subject.classificationjelHALG - Financial Economics::G1 - General Financial Markets::G18 - Government Policy and Regulationen
dc.subject.classificationjelHALH - Public Economics::H0 - General::H00 - Generalen
dc.subject.classificationjelHALO - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth::O2 - Development Planning and Policy::O21 - Planning Models; Planning Policyen
hal.date.transferred2021-09-13T13:42:22Z
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