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Rational Expectations and the Paradox of Policy-Relevant Experiments

Chemla, Gilles; Hennessy, Christopher A. (2020), Rational Expectations and the Paradox of Policy-Relevant Experiments, Journal of Monetary Economics, 114, p. 368-381. 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.05.002

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2020
Journal name
Journal of Monetary Economics
Volume
114
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
368-381
Publication identifier
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.05.002
Metadata
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Author(s)
Chemla, Gilles
Dauphine Recherches en Management [DRM]
Hennessy, Christopher A.
Abstract (EN)
Policy experiments using large microeconomic datasets have recently gained ground in macroeconomics. Imposing rational expectations, we examine robustness of evidence derived from ideal natural experiments applied to atomistic agents in dynamic settings. Paradoxically, once experimental evidence is viewed as sufficiently clean to use, it then becomes contaminated by ex post endogeneity: Measured responses depend upon priors and the objective function into which evidence is fed. Moreover, agents’ policy beliefs become endogenously correlated with their causal parameters, severely clouding inference, e.g. sign reversals and non-invertibility may obtain. Treatment-control differences are contaminated for non-quadratic adjustment costs. Constructively, we illustrate how inference can be corrected accounting for feedback and highlight factors mitigating contamination.
Subjects / Keywords
Natural experiments; Causality; Policy; endogeneity
JEL
E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
H00 - General
O21 - Planning Models; Planning Policy

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