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dc.contributor.authorBouaiss, Karima
dc.contributor.authorAlexandre, Hervé
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-07T14:47:25Z
dc.date.available2009-10-07T14:47:25Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2163
dc.descriptionCe document est également paru dans la série Working Papers de la Chaire Finance d'entreprise Dauphine - FBF, n° 2008-10, et DRM-Finance n° 2008-1
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBank governanceen
dc.subjectfinancial performanceen
dc.subjectcapital adequacyen
dc.subjectrisk-takingen
dc.subjectbanking regulationen
dc.subject.ddc658.4en
dc.subject.classificationjelG21en
dc.subject.classificationjelG34en
dc.titleThe Complementarity of Regulatory and Internal Governance Mechanisms in Banksen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenDecisions taken by the manager of a bank are subject to the regulatory discipline of the Basel Committee in conjunction with the supervisory discipline of the Board of Directors, a body that represents shareholders. This research demonstrates that the two types of discipline act in complement to each other, whereas the extant literature shows that regulatory discipline is replacing the internal discipline exercised by the Board of Directors. We also show that these internal and external governance mechanisms are relevant to explain the simultaneous influences between financial performance, risk-taking and the capitalization of French banks from 1998 to 2004.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameBankers, Markets & Investors
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue98en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2009-01
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages6-15en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherRevue Banqueen
dc.subject.ddclabelDirection d'entrepriseen


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