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The Complementarity of Regulatory and Internal Governance Mechanisms in Banks

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drmfinance0108.pdf (304.8Kb)
Date
2009
Notes
Ce document est également paru dans la série Working Papers de la Chaire Finance d'entreprise Dauphine - FBF, n° 2008-10, et DRM-Finance n° 2008-1
Dewey
Direction d'entreprise
Sujet
Bank governance; financial performance; capital adequacy; risk-taking; banking regulation
JEL code
G21; G34
Journal issue
Bankers, Markets & Investors
Number
98
Publication date
01-2009
Article pages
6-15
Publisher
Revue Banque
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2163
Collections
  • DRM : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Bouaiss, Karima
Alexandre, Hervé
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
Decisions taken by the manager of a bank are subject to the regulatory discipline of the Basel Committee in conjunction with the supervisory discipline of the Board of Directors, a body that represents shareholders. This research demonstrates that the two types of discipline act in complement to each other, whereas the extant literature shows that regulatory discipline is replacing the internal discipline exercised by the Board of Directors. We also show that these internal and external governance mechanisms are relevant to explain the simultaneous influences between financial performance, risk-taking and the capitalization of French banks from 1998 to 2004.

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