Orders of criticality in voting games
Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito; Moretti, Stefano (2016), Orders of criticality in voting games, Operations Research and Decisions, 26, 2, p. 53-67. 10.5277/ord160204
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2016Journal name
Operations Research and DecisionsVolume
26Number
2Pages
53-67
Publication identifier
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Show full item recordAuthor(s)
Dall'Aglio, MarcoFragnelli, Vito
Moretti, Stefano

Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
The authors focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, the classical notion of the criticality of players has been extended, in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to collusion with other playersSubjects / Keywords
voting game; blackmailing power; semivalueRelated items
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