Abstract (EN)

In this article, corporate law is understood as an agonistic process of rule coproduction by representatives of the public authorities and representatives of private interests. Because of the asymmetric interdependence between agents exercising their power to institute rules, including those that regulate capital accumulation, and financial intermediaries competing for the means of capital allocation, a private equity tax exemption (DSK insurance) was implemented in France in the late 1990s. Our approach more satisfactory than traditional approaches that conceptualize the state as either a neutral guarantor of the public interest or a mere instrument of capitalists makes it possible to account in detail for rivalries among financiers and fundamental disagreements between central administrations, ministry offices, and elected officials. Those antagonisms indicate that legal rules and their uses are not situated outside economic activity but are instead constitutive of how companies turn a profit. In business, setting the rules of the game is part of the game.