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Informal risk-sharing cooperatives: the effect of learning and other-regarding preferences

Barbet, Victorien; Bourlès, Renaud; Rouchier, Juliette (2020), Informal risk-sharing cooperatives: the effect of learning and other-regarding preferences, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 30, 2, p. 451–478. 10.1007/s00191-019-00644-9

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Article accepté pour publication ou publié
External document link
https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02864652
Date
2020
Journal name
Journal of Evolutionary Economics
Volume
30
Number
2
Publisher
Springer
Pages
451–478
Publication identifier
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Author(s)
Barbet, Victorien
Bourlès, Renaud
Rouchier, Juliette cc
Abstract (EN)
We study the dynamics of risk-sharing cooperatives among heterogeneous agents. Based of their knowledge on their risk exposure and the performance of the cooperatives, agents choose whether or not to remain in the risk-sharing agreement. We highlight the key role of other-regarding preference (altruism and inequality aversion) in stabilizing less segregated (and smaller) cooperatives. Limited knowledge and learning of own risk exposure also contributes to reducing segregation, the two effects (of learning and other-regarding preferences) being complementary. Our findings shed light on the mechanisms behind risk-sharing agreements between agents heterogeneous in their risk exposure.
Subjects / Keywords
risk-sharing; agent-based; cooperative; learning; altruism; other-regarding preferences