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Simultaneous Elicitation of Committee and Voters' Preferences

Napolitano, Beatrice; Cailloux, Olivier; Viappiani, Paolo (2019), Simultaneous Elicitation of Committee and Voters' Preferences, in Lefrançois, Maxime, Actes des 17èmes Rencontres des Jeunes Chercheurs en Intelligence Artificielle (RJCIA 2019), Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, p. 59-62

Type
Communication / Conférence
External document link
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02160455
Date
2019
Conference title
Rencontres des Jeunes Chercheurs en Intelligence Artificielle 2019
Conference date
2019-07
Conference city
Toulouse
Conference country
France
Book title
Actes des 17èmes Rencontres des Jeunes Chercheurs en Intelligence Artificielle (RJCIA 2019)
Book author
Lefrançois, Maxime
Publisher
Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik
Pages
59-62
Metadata
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Author(s)
Napolitano, Beatrice
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Cailloux, Olivier cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Viappiani, Paolo cc
Abstract (EN)
Social choice deals with the problem of determining a consensus choice from the preferences of different voters. In the classical setting, the voting rule is fixed beforehand and full information concerning he preferences of the voters is provided. Recently, the assumption of full preference information has been questioned by a number of researchers and several methods for eliciting preferences have been proposed. In this paper we go one step further and we assume that both the voting rule and the voters’ preferences are partially specified. In this setting, we present an interactive elicitation protocol based on minimax regret and develop several query strategies that interleave questions to the chair and questions to the voters in order to attempt to acquire the most relevant information in order to quickly converge to optimal or a near-optimal alternative.
Subjects / Keywords
Computational Social Choice; uncertainty in AI; minimax regret; preference elicitation

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