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dc.contributor.authorHoran, Sean
dc.contributor.authorOsborne, Martin
dc.contributor.authorSanver, Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-21T10:57:24Z
dc.date.available2020-09-21T10:57:24Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20987
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subject.ddc003en
dc.titlePositively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives,
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenMay's theorem shows that if the set of alternatives contains two members, an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule is positively responsive if and only if it is majority rule. We show that if the set of alternatives contains three or more alternatives only the rule that assigns to every problem its strict Condorcet winner satisfies the three conditions plus Nash's version of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” for the domain of problems that have strict Condorcet winners. We show also that no rule satisfies the four conditions for domains that are more than slightly larger.
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameInternational Economic Review
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol60
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue4
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2019
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1489-1504
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1111/iere.12394
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherWiley
dc.subject.ddclabelRecherche opérationnelleen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidatenon
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedoui
dc.date.updated2020-12-17T09:10:20Z
hal.person.labIds91958$$$26166
hal.person.labIds84669
hal.person.labIds989


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