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Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives,

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Date
2019
Dewey
Recherche opérationnelle
Journal issue
International Economic Review
Volume
60
Number
4
Publication date
2019
Article pages
1489-1504
Publisher
Wiley
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12394
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20987
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Horan, Sean
Osborne, Martin
Sanver, Remzi
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
May's theorem shows that if the set of alternatives contains two members, an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule is positively responsive if and only if it is majority rule. We show that if the set of alternatives contains three or more alternatives only the rule that assigns to every problem its strict Condorcet winner satisfies the three conditions plus Nash's version of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” for the domain of problems that have strict Condorcet winners. We show also that no rule satisfies the four conditions for domains that are more than slightly larger.

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