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Portioning Using Ordinal Preferences: Fairness and Efficiency

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portioning_using.pdf (243.2Kb)
Date
2019
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems; Cooperative Games; Computational Social Choice
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/2
Conference name
28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2019)
Conference date
2019
Conference country
CHINA
Book title
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
Author
Sarit Kraus
Publisher
IJCAI
ISBN
978-0-9992411-4-1
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20829
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Airiau, Stéphane
Aziz, Haris
Caragiannis, Ioannis
Lang, Jérôme
Peters, Dominik
Kruger, Justin
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
11-17
Abstract (EN)
A public divisible resource is to be divided among projects. We study rules that decide on a distribution of the budget when voters have ordinal preference rankings over projects. Examples of such portioning problems are participatory budgeting, time shares, and parliament elections. We introduce a family of rules for portioning, inspired by positional scoring rules. Rules in this family are given by a scoring vector (such as plurality or Borda) associating a positive value with each rank in a vote, and an aggregation function such as leximin or the Nash product. Our family contains well-studied rules, but most are new. We discuss computational and normative properties of our rules. We focus on fairness, and introduce the SD-core, a group fairness notion. Our Nash rules are in the SD-core, and the leximin rules satisfy individual fairness properties. Both are Pareto-efficient.

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