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Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds

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11531-Article_(PDF)-23295-1-10-20200405.pdf (353.0Kb)
Date
2019
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
game theory; multiagent systems; mathematical foundations
Journal issue
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Number
67
Publication date
04-2020
Article pages
705-756
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11531
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20828
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Kerkmann, Anna Maria
84577 Institut für Informatik [Düsseldorf]
Lang, Jérôme
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Rey, Anja
465916 Fakultät für Informatik, TU Dortmund
Rothe, Jorg
84577 Institut für Informatik [Düsseldorf]
Schadrack, Hilmar
84577 Institut für Informatik [Düsseldorf]
Schend, Lena
84577 Institut für Informatik [Düsseldorf]
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We propose a new representation setting for hedonic games, where each agent partitions the set of other agents into friends, enemies, and neutral agents, with friends and enemies being ranked. Under the assumption that preferences are monotonic (respectively, antimonotonic) with respect to the addition of friends (respectively, enemies), we propose a bipolar extension of the responsive extension principle, and use this principle to derive the (partial) preferences of agents over coalitions. Then, for a number of solution concepts, we characterize partitions that necessarily or possibly satisfy them, and we study the related problems in terms of their complexity.

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