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Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule

Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida (2016), Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule, Social Choice and Welfare, 54, 2-3, p. 429–461. 10.1007/s00355-019-01200-x

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2016
Journal name
Social Choice and Welfare
Volume
54
Number
2-3
Publisher
Springer
Pages
429–461
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Balinski, Michel
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique [CREST]
Laraki, Rida cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on evaluating candidates—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparing candidates—lead to another method, majority judgment, that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of “polarized” candidates. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.
Subjects / Keywords
measuring; ranking; electing; majority rule; Condorcet consis-tency; tyranny of majority; intensity problem; majority-gauge; strategy-proofness; polarization