Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule

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Date
2016Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquéesSujet
measuring; ranking; electing; majority rule; Condorcet consis-tency; tyranny of majority; intensity problem; majority-gauge; strategy-proofness; polarizationJournal issue
Social Choice and WelfareVolume
54Number
2-3Publication date
03-2020Article pages
429–461Publisher
SpringerCollections
Metadata
Show full item recordAuthor
Balinski, Michel
2579 Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique [CREST]
Laraki, Rida
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Type
Abstract (EN)
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on evaluating candidates—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparing candidates—lead to another method, majority judgment, that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of “polarized” candidates. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.Related items
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