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dc.contributor.authorAïd, René*
dc.contributor.authorBasei, Matteo*
dc.contributor.authorPham, Huyên*
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-25T14:08:14Z
dc.date.available2020-01-25T14:08:14Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn1432-2994
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20472
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectDecarbonation
dc.subjectDistributed generation
dc.subjectStochastic game
dc.subjectMcKean–Vlasov
dc.subjectL94
dc.subjectC73
dc.subjectC61
dc.subjectO33
dc.subjectQ41
dc.subjectQ42
dc.subject.ddc333en
dc.subject.classificationjelL.L9.L94en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C6.C61en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C7.C73en
dc.subject.classificationjelO.O3.O33en
dc.subject.classificationjelQ.Q4.Q41en
dc.subject.classificationjelQ.Q4.Q42en
dc.titleA McKean-Vlasov approach to distributed electricity generation development
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis paper analyses the interaction between centralised carbon emissive technologies and distributed intermittent non-emissive technologies. In our model, there is a representative consumer who can satisfy her electricity demand by investing in distributed generation (solar panels) and by buying power from a centralised firm at a price the firm sets. Distributed generation is intermittent and induces an externality cost to the consumer. The firm provides non-random electricity generation subject to a carbon tax and to transmission costs. The objective of the consumer is to satisfy her demand while minimising investment costs, payments to the firm and intermittency costs. The objective of the firm is to satisfy the consumer’s residual demand while minimising investment costs, demand deviation costs, and maximising the payments from the consumer. We formulate the investment decisions as McKean–Vlasov control problems with stochastic coefficients. We provide explicit, price model-free solutions to the optimal decision problems faced by each player, the solution of the Pareto optimum, and the Stackelberg equilibrium where the firm is the leader. We find that, from the social planner’s point of view, the carbon tax or transmission costs are necessary to justify a positive share of distributed capacity in the long-term, whatever the respective investment costs of both technologies are. The Stackelberg equilibrium is far from the Pareto equilibrium and leads to an over-investment in distributed energy and to a much higher price for centralised energy.
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameMathematical Methods of Operations Research
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2019
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1-42
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1007/s00186-019-00692-8
dc.identifier.urlsitehttps://arxiv.org/abs/1705.01302v3
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringer
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie de la terre et des ressources naturellesen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintouien
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidatenon
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedoui
dc.date.updated2020-04-10T12:28:48Z
hal.person.labIds559342*
hal.person.labIds172051*
hal.person.labIds1004954*


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