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dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-21T15:52:15Z
dc.date.available2020-01-21T15:52:15Z
dc.date.issued2012-06
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20463
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBayesian gameen
dc.subjectcommitmenten
dc.subjectincentive compatibilityen
dc.subjectindependent private valuesen
dc.subjectindividual rationalityen
dc.subjectinfinitely repeated gameen
dc.subjectpublicgooden
dc.subject.ddc330.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C7.C72en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C7.C73en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C7.C71en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D8.D82en
dc.subject.classificationjelH.H4.H41en
dc.titleFolk theorems for Bayesian (public good) gamesen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenTwo characterization results are behind the intimate relationshipbetween "repetition" and "cooperation" under complete information:the standard Folk theorem for infinitely repeated games and the "commitment Folk theorem" for one-shot games. We propose extensionsof the previous characterization results in Bayesian games, with independent private values, which satisfy a further property, "uniformpunishment strategies". Public good games fall in this class. We showthat the Nash equilibria of the Bayesian infinitely repeated game arepayoff equivalent to separating (i.e., completely revealing) equilibriaand can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the Bayesiangame. We also show that the reverse of the latter result is not true:unlike the set of interim cooperative solutions of the Bayesian game,the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the infinitely repeated game canbe empty.en
dc.identifier.citationpages30en
dc.subject.ddclabelThéorie économiqueen
dc.relation.conftitleThirteenth annual conference (PET12) of the Association for Public Economic Theory (APET)en
dc.relation.confdate2012-06
dc.relation.confcityTaipeien
dc.relation.confcountryChinaen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewednonen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewednonen
dc.date.updated2019-12-06T09:56:48Z
hal.person.labIds60$$$163511
hal.identifierhal-02447604*


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