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Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games

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f305e0481adbfc7146f5aa1a2c72bd522ca0.pdf (246.6Kb)
Date
2012-06
Dewey
Théorie économique
Sujet
Bayesian game; commitment; incentive compatibility; independent private values; individual rationality; infinitely repeated game; publicgood
JEL code
C.C7.C72; C.C7.C73; C.C7.C71; D.D8.D82; H.H4.H41
Conference name
Thirteenth annual conference (PET12) of the Association for Public Economic Theory (APET)
Conference date
06-2012
Conference city
Taipei
Conference country
China
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20463
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  • LEDa : Publications
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Author
Forges, Françoise
60 CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
163511 Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
30
Abstract (EN)
Two characterization results are behind the intimate relationshipbetween "repetition" and "cooperation" under complete information:the standard Folk theorem for infinitely repeated games and the "commitment Folk theorem" for one-shot games. We propose extensionsof the previous characterization results in Bayesian games, with independent private values, which satisfy a further property, "uniformpunishment strategies". Public good games fall in this class. We showthat the Nash equilibria of the Bayesian infinitely repeated game arepayoff equivalent to separating (i.e., completely revealing) equilibriaand can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the Bayesiangame. We also show that the reverse of the latter result is not true:unlike the set of interim cooperative solutions of the Bayesian game,the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the infinitely repeated game canbe empty.

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