Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games
Date
2012-06Dewey
Théorie économiqueSujet
Bayesian game; commitment; incentive compatibility; independent private values; individual rationality; infinitely repeated game; publicgoodJEL code
C.C7.C72; C.C7.C73; C.C7.C71; D.D8.D82; H.H4.H41Conference name
Thirteenth annual conference (PET12) of the Association for Public Economic Theory (APET)Conference date
06-2012Conference city
TaipeiConference country
ChinaCollections
Metadata
Show full item recordAuthor
Forges, Françoise
60 CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
163511 Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
163511 Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]