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Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion

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Date
2008
Dewey
Economie politique
Sujet
Disclosure of certifiable information; Partial provability; Persuasion; Separating equilibrium; Verifiable types
JEL code
C.C7.C72; D.D8.D82
Journal issue
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
143
Number
1
Publication date
2008
Article pages
571-584
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20419
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
Show full item record
Author
Mathis, Jérôme
163511 Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
744 Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative [GREMAQ]
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender–Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163–170] results to games with partial provability.

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