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dc.contributor.authorAlary, David
dc.contributor.authorBien, Franck
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-02T17:03:25Z
dc.date.available2019-12-02T17:03:25Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20300
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectAdverse Selectionen
dc.subjectBackground risken
dc.subjectOptimal Contracten
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelD.D8.D82en
dc.titleOptimal insurance with adverse selection and comonotonic background risken
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenIn this note, we consider an adverse selection problem involving an insurance market à la Rothschild-Stiglitz. We assume that part of the loss is uninsurable as in the case with health care or environmental risk. We characterize sufficient conditions such that adverse selection by itself does not distort competitive insurance contracts. A sufficiently large uninsurable loss provides an incentive to high-risk policy holders not to mimic low-risk policy holders without distorting the optimal coverage.en
dc.publisher.cityToulouseen
dc.identifier.citationpages7en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleDocument de travail LERNAen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber8en
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.date.updated2019-11-26T17:20:28Z
hal.person.labIds29765
hal.person.labIds559342
hal.identifierhal-02390017*


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