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Price discrimination in bribe payments: Evidence from informal cross-border trade in West Africa

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Date
2019
Dewey
Economie internationale
Sujet
Informal trade; Corruption; Trade policy
JEL code
O.O1.O17; F.F1.F14; F.F1.F15
Journal issue
World Development
Volume
122
Publication date
2019
Article pages
462-480
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.05.023
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20298
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Bensassi, Sami
108696 Birmingham Business School
Jarreau, Joachim
163511 Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
What factors explain the persistence and pervasiveness of corruption in certain parts of the world? In West Africa, many day-to-day transactions require the payment of bribes. Quantitative evidence on these bribes and their determinants is scarce. This paper sheds light on the level and the frequency of bribe payments in informal coss-border trade. It examines how bribes depend on the trade regime and on market structure. We rely on data from a survey of traders in Benin to estimate the determinants of bribe payments. We exploit variations in the trade regime across Benin’s borders, as well as changes in trade restrictions over time and variations in route availability across space and time. We find that reductions in trade barriers help to lower bribes, but do not eliminate them, with bribes remaining frequent in liberalized trade regimes. These results suggest that collusive corruption – used to circumvent regulations and taxes – coexists with coercive corruption, where officials use their monopoly power to extract transfers from traders.

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