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dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.contributor.authorHorst, Ulrich
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-11T14:14:16Z
dc.date.available2019-10-11T14:14:16Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn0304-4068
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20093
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCommitmenten
dc.subjectCheap talken
dc.subjectIncentive compatibilityen
dc.subjectInformation transmissionen
dc.subjectPerfect Bayesian equilibriumen
dc.subject.ddc330.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C7.C70en
dc.titleSender-receiver games with cooperationen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe consider generalized sender–receiver games in which the sender also has an action to choose, but this action is payoff-relevant only to himself. We study “cooperate and talk” equilibria (CTE) in which, before sending his message, the sender can commit to delegate his decision to the receiver. CTE are beneficial to the receiver (with respect to no communication) and unlike the equilibria of the plain cheap talk game, preserve him from afterwards regret. While existence of CTE cannot be guaranteed in general, a sufficient condition is that the receiver has a “uniform punishment decision” against the sender.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Mathematical Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol76en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2018-05
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages52 - 61en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.002en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelThéorie économiqueen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2019-09-30T15:02:01Z
hal.person.labIds60$$$163511
hal.person.labIds4560$$$99871
hal.identifierhal-02313962*


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