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Sender-receiver games with cooperation

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Date
2018
Dewey
Théorie économique
Sujet
Commitment; Cheap talk; Incentive compatibility; Information transmission; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
JEL code
C.C7.C70
Journal issue
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume
76
Publication date
05-2018
Article pages
52 - 61
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.002
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20093
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
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Author
Forges, Françoise
60 CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
163511 Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Horst, Ulrich
4560 Institut für Mathematik [Berlin]
99871 Université Humboldt de Berlin
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We consider generalized sender–receiver games in which the sender also has an action to choose, but this action is payoff-relevant only to himself. We study “cooperate and talk” equilibria (CTE) in which, before sending his message, the sender can commit to delegate his decision to the receiver. CTE are beneficial to the receiver (with respect to no communication) and unlike the equilibria of the plain cheap talk game, preserve him from afterwards regret. While existence of CTE cannot be guaranteed in general, a sufficient condition is that the receiver has a “uniform punishment decision” against the sender.

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