Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions
Fack, Gabrielle; Grenet, Julien; He, Yinghua (2019), Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions, The American Economic Review, 109, 4, p. 1486-1529. 10.1257/aer.20151422
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameThe American Economic Review
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.
Subjects / KeywordsGale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism; School Choice; CollegeAdmissions; Stable Matching; Student Preferences
Showing items related by title and author.
Burkovska, O.; Haasdonk, Bernard; Salomon, Julien; Wohlmuth, Barbara (2015) Article accepté pour publication ou publié