hal.structure.identifier | Centre de recherche en économie et management [CREM] | |
hal.structure.identifier | Théorie économique, modélisation et applications [THEMA] | |
dc.contributor.author | Biancini, Sara | |
hal.structure.identifier | CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE] | |
hal.structure.identifier | Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa] | |
dc.contributor.author | Ettinger, David | |
hal.structure.identifier | Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa] | |
hal.structure.identifier | Développement, institutions et analyses de long terme [DIAL] | |
hal.structure.identifier | Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) | |
dc.contributor.author | Venet, Baptiste | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-10-03T09:00:08Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-10-03T09:00:08Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/19987 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.subject | Microfinance | en |
dc.subject | Funding Institutions | en |
dc.subject | Mission Drift | en |
dc.subject | Contract Theory | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 338.9 | en |
dc.subject.classificationjel | O.O1.O12 | en |
dc.subject.classificationjel | O.O1.O16 | en |
dc.subject.classificationjel | G.G2.G21 | en |
dc.title | Mission Drift in Microcredit: A Contract Theory Approach | en |
dc.type | Document de travail / Working paper | |
dc.description.abstracten | We analyze the relationship between Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and external funding institutions, with the aim of contributing to the debate on “mission drift” (the tendencyfor MFIs to lend money to wealthier borrower rather than to the very poor). We suggestthat funding institutions build incentives for MFIs to choose the adequate share of poorerborrowers and to exert effort to increase the quality of the funded projects. We show thatasymmetric information on both the effort level and its cost may increase the share of richerborrowers. However the unobservability of the cost of effort has an ambiguous effect. Itpushes efficient MFIs to serve a higher share of poorer borrowers, while less efficient onesdecrease their poor outreach. | en |
dc.publisher.name | Document de travail du LEDa | en |
dc.identifier.citationpages | 30 | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitle | Document de travail du LEDa | en |
dc.contributor.countryeditoruniversityother | FRANCE | |
dc.subject.ddclabel | Croissance et développement économiques | en |
dc.identifier.citationdate | 2018 | |
dc.description.ssrncandidate | non | en |
dc.description.halcandidate | oui | en |
dc.description.readership | recherche | en |
dc.description.audience | International | en |
dc.date.updated | 2019-09-23T14:10:30Z | |
hal.identifier | hal-02304352 | * |
hal.version | 1 | * |
hal.update.action | updateFiles | * |
hal.author.function | aut | |
hal.author.function | aut | |
hal.author.function | aut | |