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The effects of penalty information on tax compliance: evidence from a New Zealand field experiment

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WP032017.pdf (1.140Mb)
Date
2017
Publisher city
Victoria
Publisher
The Working Papers in Public Finance
Publishing date
2017
Collection title
The Working Papers in Public Finance
Collection Id
03/2017
Dewey
Economie publique
Sujet
Tax evasion; late payment penalties; tax experiment; goods and service tax
JEL code
H.H2.H26; C.C9.C93
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/19951
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Gemmell, Norman
120296 School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University, Wellington
Ratto, Marisa
163511 Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Type
Document de travail / Working paper
Item number of pages
31
Abstract (EN)
The ‘standard’ Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion predicts effects oncompliance which depend on the perceived probability of detection, tax rate and penalty forevasion. Compliance effects of detection probabilities and tax rates have been extensively testedempirically, but penalty effects are rarely tested explicitly. This paper examines the effects of latepayment penalties on tax compliance based on an experiment involving New Zealand goods andservice tax (GST) ‘late payers’. Firstly, based on an ASY-type model of tax late payments in whichthe probability of enforcement, rather than detection, is central, we develop a number of testablehypotheses. Secondly, based on a field experiment involving a specific compliance intervention, weexamine how taxpayers respond when given different penalty information. The experiment alsoallows us to consider differences between taxpayers’ stated intentions to comply and subsequentlyobserved compliance. Results suggest that differences in penalty information given to taxpayersand reductions in penalty rates both affect taxpayers stated intentions to comply (pay overdue taxand penalties) as predicted. However, subsequently observed responses generally appearunresponsive to penalties. Nevertheless, various individual taxpayer characteristics are identifiablethat affect both compliance intentions and actual behaviour.

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