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Project Games

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Date
2019
Notes
Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11485)
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
Strategic games; Price of anarchy/stability; Congestion
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17402-6_7
Conference name
11th International Conference, CIAC 2019
Conference date
05-2019
Conference city
Rome
Conference country
Italy
Book title
Algorithms and Complexity
Author
Heggernes, Pinar
Publisher
Springer
Publisher city
Berlin Heidelberg
Year
2019
Pages number
378
ISBN
978-3-030-17401-9
Book URL
10.1007/978-3-030-17402-6
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/19242
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
Show full item record
Author
Bilò, Vittorio
134574 Dipartimento di Matematica Ennio De Giorgi
Gourvès, Laurent
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Monnot, Jérôme
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
75-86
Abstract (EN)
We consider a strategic game called project game where each agent has to choose a project among his own list of available projects. The model includes positive weights expressing the capacity of a given agent to contribute to a given project. The realization of a project produces some reward that has to be allocated to the agents. The reward of a realized project is fully allocated to its contributors, according to a simple proportional rule. Existence and computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria is addressed and their efficiency is investigated according to both the utilitarian and the egalitarian social function.

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