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Ceteris Paribus Majority for social ranking

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0042.pdf (152.4Kb)
Date
2018
Dewey
Intelligence artificielle
Sujet
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Cooperative Games; Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Knowledge Representation and Game Theory; Social Choice; Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/42
Conference name
27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-ECAI-18)
Conference date
07-2018
Conference city
Stockholm
Conference country
Sweden
Book title
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-18)
Author
Lang, Jérôme
Publisher
AAAI Press / IJCAI
Publisher city
Palo Alto (USA)
Year
2018
ISBN
978-0-9992411-2-7
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/18694
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Haret, Adrian
155710 Technical University of Wien
Khani, Hossein
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Moretti, Stefano
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Ozturk, Meltem
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
303-309
Abstract (EN)
We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution inspired from the classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example.

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