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On the (in)efficiency of MFG equilibria

hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
dc.contributor.authorCardaliaguet, Pierre
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire de Mathématiques de Bretagne Atlantique [LMBA]
dc.contributor.authorRainer, Catherine
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-26T09:46:04Z
dc.date.available2019-03-26T09:46:04Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn0363-0129
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/18574
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectMean field gamesen
dc.subjectNash MFG equilibriaen
dc.subject.ddc515en
dc.titleOn the (in)efficiency of MFG equilibriaen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenMean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this context, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global planner can achieve. We find a structure condition on the game under which there exists efficient MFG equilibria and, in case this condition is not fulfilled, quantify how inefficient MFG equilibria are.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameSIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2019
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages22en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01711419en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSIAM - Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematicsen
dc.subject.ddclabelAnalyseen
dc.relation.forthcomingouien
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidatenonen
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2019-03-26T09:42:27Z
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


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