On the (in)efficiency of MFG equilibria

Cardaliaguet, Pierre; Rainer, Catherine

Cardaliaguet, Pierre; Rainer, Catherine (2019), On the (in)efficiency of MFG equilibria, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, p. 22

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Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

External document link

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01711419

Date

2019

Journal name

SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization

Publisher

SIAM - Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics

Metadata

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Author(s)

Cardaliaguet, Pierre
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Rainer, Catherine
Laboratoire de Mathématiques de Bretagne Atlantique [LMBA]

Abstract (EN)

Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this context, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global planner can achieve. We find a structure condition on the game under which there exists efficient MFG equilibria and, in case this condition is not fulfilled, quantify how inefficient MFG equilibria are.

Subjects / Keywords

Mean field games; Nash MFG equilibria